Indeed, it lacks not only truth, but also linguistic meaning. Other beings, for example, Martians, might well apprehend molecular motion in another fashion.
It is often alleged, more broadly, that dualism is unscientific and renders impossible any genuine science of mind or truly empirical psychology. That is, things can become taller, but they also can become shorter; things can become sweeter, but also more bitter.
This would be the argument employed by an identity theorist. The objection that minds and bodies cannot interact can be the expression of two different sorts of view. On this view, the mind may be likened to the steam from a train engine; the steam does not affect the workings of the engine but is caused by it.
Therefore, he is a non-bodily "thinking thing," or mind.
The general problem of discerning where the boundary lies between epistemology and metaphysics is, after all, just one more part of the Cartesian legacy. If, however, the emphasis here falls on constitutive principles in particular—as surely it must—then two other problems arise.
The answer I would give to the question 'What did Descartes find? For a general discussion of whether the self is a substance, see Shoemaker,ch.
One important component of such descriptions is their capacity to figure in strict laws of nature see 3. While Anomalous Monism is not officially concerned with the ontological status of substances, it thus appears to have consequences that are inconsistent with Descartes' substance dualism—though it doesn't by itself establish substance monism, it does rule out the Cartesian thought that mental and physical events fail to be identical, and so conflicts with one of the bases for Cartesian substance dualism.